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Balanced Growth Despite Uzawa†
By Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, Ezra Oberfield,  
and Thomas Sampson*
The evidence for the United States points to balanced growth despite 
falling investment-good prices and a less-than-unitary elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labor. This is inconsistent 
with the Uzawa Growth Theorem. We extend Uzawa’s theorem 
to show that the introduction of human capital accumulation in 
the standard way does not resolve the puzzle. However, balanced 
growth is possible if education is endogenous and capital is more 
complementary with schooling than with raw labor. We present a 
class of aggregate production functions for which a neoclassical 
growth model with capital-augmenting technological progress 
and endogenous schooling converges to a balanced growth path.  (JEL E22, E24, I26, J24, O33, O41, O47)
Some key facts about economic growth have become common lore. Among those 
famously cited by Kaldor (1961) are the observation that output per worker and cap-
ital per worker have grown steadily, while the capital-output ratio, the real return on 
capital, and the shares of capital and labor in national income have remained fairly 
constant. Jones (2016, p. 5) updates these facts using the latest available data. He 
reports that real per capita GDP in the United States has grown “at a remarkably 
steady average rate of around two percent per year” for a period of nearly 150 years, 
while the ratio of physical capital to output has remained nearly constant. The shares 
of capital and labor in total factor payments were very stable from 1945 through 
about 2000.1
1 As is well known from Piketty (2014) and others before him and since, the capital share in national income 
has been rising, and that of labor falling, since around 2000: see, for example, Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013); 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014); and Lawrence (2015). It is not clear yet whether this is a temporary fluctuation 
around the longstanding division, part of a transition to a new steady-state division, or perhaps (as Piketty asserts) 
a permanent departure from stable factor shares. 
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These facts suggest to many the relevance of a balanced growth path and thus the 
need for models that predict sustained growth of output, consumption, and capital 
at constant rates. Indeed, neoclassical growth theory was developed largely with 
this goal in mind. Apparently, it succeeded. As Jones and Romer (2010, p. 225) 
conclude: “There is no longer any interesting debate about the features that a model 
must contain to explain [the Kaldor facts]. These features are embedded in one of 
the great successes of growth theory in the 1950s and 1960s, the neoclassical growth 
model.”
Alas, “all is not well,” as Hamlet might say. Jones (2016) highlights yet another 
fact that was noted earlier by Gordon (1990), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell 
(1997), and others: the relative price of capital equipment, adjusted for quality, has 
been falling steadily and dramatically since at least 1960. Figure 1 reproduces two 
series from the FRED database.2 In the period from 1947 to 2013, the relative price of 
investment goods declined at a compounded average rate of 2.0 percent per annum. 
The relative price of equipment declined at an even faster annual rate of 3.8 percent.
The observation of falling capital prices rests uncomfortably with features of the 
economy thought to be needed for balanced growth. As Uzawa (1961) pointed out, 
and Schlicht (2006) and Jones and Scrimgeour (2008) later clarified, a  balanced 
growth path in the two-factor neoclassical growth model with a constant and 
2 The Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) are maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Their 
investment and equipment prices are based on updates of Gordon’s (1990) series by Cummins and Violante (2002) 
and DiCecio (2009). 
Figure 1. US Relative Price of Equipment, 1947–2013
Source: Federal Reserve Bank Economic Data (FRED), series PIRIC and PERIC
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 exogenous rate of population growth and a constant rate of labor-augmenting tech-
nological progress requires either an aggregate production function with a unitary 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor or else an absence of capital-aug-
menting technological progress. The size of the elasticity of substitution is much 
debated and still controversial; yet, a preponderance of the evidence suggests an elas-
ticity well below 1.3 And the decline in quality-adjusted prices of investment goods 
(and especially equipment) relative to final output suggests that  capital-augmenting 
technological progress—embodied, for example, in each new generation of equip-
ment—has been occurring.4
The Uzawa Growth Theorem rests on the impossibility of getting an endogenous 
rate of capital accumulation to line up with an exogenous growth rate of effec-
tive labor in the presence of capital-augmenting technological progress, unless the 
aggregate production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form. The problem, it would 
seem, stems from the model’s assumption of an inelastic supply of effective labor 
that does not respond to capital deepening, even over time. If human capital could 
be accumulated via, for example, investments in schooling, then perhaps effective 
labor growth would fall into line with growth in effective capital, and a balanced 
growth path would be possible in a broader set of circumstances. Seen in this light, 
another fact about the US growth experience is encouraging. We reproduce—as did 
Jones (2016)—a figure from Goldin and Katz (2007). Figure 2 shows the average 
years of schooling measured at age 30 for all cohorts of native American work-
ers born between 1876 and 1982.5 Clearly, educational attainment has been rising 
steadily for more than a century. Put differently, there has been ongoing investment 
in human capital. Indeed, Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988), and others have established 
existence of balanced growth paths in neoclassical growth models that incorpo-
rate standard treatments of human capital accumulation, albeit in settings that lack 
 capital-augmenting technological progress.6
Unfortunately, the usual formulation of human capital does not do the trick. In the 
next section, we prove an extended version of the Uzawa Growth Theorem that allows 
for education. We specify an aggregate production function that has effective capital 
(the product of physical capital and a productivity-augmenting technology term) and 
human capital as arguments. Human capital can be any increasing function of tech-
nology-augmented raw labor and a variable that measures cumulative  investments 
in schooling. In this setting, we show that balanced growth again requires either a 
3 Chirinko (2008, p. 671), for example, who surveyed and evaluated a large number of studies that attempted to 
measure this elasticity, concluded that “the weight of the evidence suggests a value of [the elasticity of substitution] 
in the range of 0.4 to 0.6.” In research conducted since that survey, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimate 
an elasticity of substitution greater than 1, but Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (2011); Oberfield and Raval (2014); 
Chirinko and Mallick (2014); Herrendorf, Herrington, and Valentinyi (2013); and Lawrence (2015) all estimate 
elasticities below 1. 
4 Motivated by Uzawa’s Growth Theorem, Acemoglu (2003) and Jones (2005) develop theories of directed 
technical change in order to provide an explanation for the absence of capital-augmenting technical change. To 
be consistent with balanced growth, both look for restrictions that would lead endogenous technical change to 
be entirely labor-augmenting. Neither attempts to reconcile capital-augmenting technical change with balanced 
growth. 
5 We are grateful to Larry Katz for providing the unpublished data that allowed us to extend his earlier figure. 
6 Uzawa (1965) studies a model with endogenous accumulation of human capital in which education augments 
effective labor supply so as to generate convergence to a steady state. Lucas (1988) incorporates an externality in his 
measure of human capital, a possibility that we do not consider here. Acemoglu (2009, pp. 371–74) characterizes a 
balanced growth path in a setting with overlapping generations. 
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unitary elasticity of substitution between physical capital and human capital or an 
absence of capital-augmenting technological progress. The intuition is similar to that 
provided by Jones and Scrimgeour for the original Uzawa theorem. Along a balanced 
growth path, the value of physical capital that is produced from final goods inherits 
the trend in output.7 But the growth rate of final output is a weighted average of the 
growth rates of effective capital and effective labor, with factor shares as weights. If 
these shares are to remain constant along a balanced growth path with an aggregate 
production function that is not Cobb-Douglas, then effective capital and effective 
labor must grow at common rates. So, the growth rate of output also mirrors the 
growth rate of effective capital. If the growth rate of output must be equal to both the 
growth rate of physical capital and that of effective capital, then there is no room for 
capital productivity to improve or for the cost of investment goods to fall.
But our findings in Section I also suggest a resolution to the puzzle. Ongoing 
increases in education potentially can reconcile the existence of a balanced growth 
path with a sustained rise in capital or investment productivity and an elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor less than unity, provided that schooling enters 
the aggregate production function in a particular way. If the production technology 
is such that investments in schooling offset the change in the capital share that results 
from capital deepening, balanced growth can emerge. To be more precise, suppose 
7 If the price of investment goods relative to consumption can change—something Jones and Scrimgeour did 
not consider—the analogous requirement is that the value of the capital stock inherits the growth rate of output. 
Figure 2. US Education by Birth Cohort, 1876–1982
Source: Goldin and Katz (2007) and additional data from Lawrence Katz
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that  F (K, L, s ; t) is the output that can be produced with the technology available at 
time  t by  L units of raw labor and  K units of physical capital, when the economy has 
an education level summarized by the scalar measure  s . The measure might reflect, 
for example, the average years of schooling in the workforce or the relative supplies 
of skilled to unskilled hours. Suppose that  F ( · ) has constant returns to scale in  K 
and  L and that  σ KL < 1 , where  σ KL ≡  F L  F K /F F LK is the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor, holding schooling constant. We will show that a balanced 
growth path with constant factor shares, positive capital-augmenting technological 
progress, and a rising index of educational attainment can emerge if and only if the 
ratio of the marginal product of schooling to the marginal product of labor rises as 
the capital stock grows: i.e.,  ∂ ( F s / F L ) /∂K > 0 . Clearly, this precludes a produc-
tion function of the form  F (K, H ; t) , where  H = G (L, s) is a standard measure of 
human capital, because then  F s / F L is independent of  K . A necessary condition for 
balanced growth in the presence of capital-augmenting technological progress and 
a non-unitary elasticity of substitution is a sufficient degree of complementarity 
between capital and education. Of course, many researchers have noted the empiri-
cal relevance of capital-skill complementarity (see, most prominently, Krusell et al. 
2000 and Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998), albeit with varying interpretations of the 
word “skill” and of the word “complementarity.” Our analysis makes clear that the 
appropriate sense of complementarity is a relative one: growth in the capital stock 
must raise the marginal product of schooling relatively more than it does the mar-
ginal product of raw labor.
The fact that schooling gains can offset the effects of capital-augmenting tech-
nological progress on the capital share does not of course mean that they will do so 
in a reasonable model of education decisions. We proceed in Section II to introduce 
optimizing behavior. We first solve a social planner’s problem that incorporates a 
reduced-form specification of the trade-off between an index of an economy’s edu-
cation level and its labor supply. A simplifying assumption is that an economy’s 
schooling can be represented by a scalar measure that can jump from one moment 
to the next. Under this assumption, when the aggregate production function belongs 
to a specified class, the optimal growth trajectory converges to a balanced-growth 
path with constant rates of growth of output, consumption and capital, and constant 
factor shares. Following the presentation of the planner’s problem, we describe two 
distinct models in which the market equilibrium shares the dynamic properties of 
the efficient solution. In both models, the economy is populated by a continuum of 
similar dynasties, each comprising a sequence of family members who survive for 
only infinitesimal lifespans. In the time-in-school model of Section IIB, each indi-
vidual decides what fraction of her brief existence to devote to schooling, thereby 
determining her productivity in her remaining time as a worker. Firms allocate capi-
tal to their various employees as a function of their productivity levels and therefore 
their schooling. In the manager-worker model of Section IIC, individuals instead 
make a discrete educational choice. Those who spend a fixed fraction of their life 
in school are trained to work as managers with their remaining time. Those who do 
not opt for management training have their full lives to serve as production work-
ers. In this case, our measure of the economy’s education level is the ratio of man-
ager hours to worker hours. We take the productivity of a production unit (workers 
combined with equipment) as increasing in this ratio due to improved monitoring. 
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In both models the economy converges to a balanced-growth path for a specified 
class of production functions, all of whose members are characterized by stronger 
complementarity between capital and schooling than between capital and raw labor.
The class of production functions that we describe in our Assumption 1 is not 
only sufficient for the emergence of balanced growth, but (essentially) necessary 
as well.8 The endogenous gains in education must not only counteract the decline 
in capital share that would otherwise result from capital-augmenting technological 
progress with  σ KL < 1 , but they must do so exactly. The requirements for balanced 
growth remain strong, but they are not obviously at odds with the empirical evi-
dence. Moreover, the restrictions on technology are no stronger than those relating 
to preferences that are known to be needed for balanced growth. Importantly, our 
simplifying assumptions about demographics and education are not essential to the 
argument; we show in our working paper (Grossman et al. 2016) that balanced 
growth can emerge in an overlapping-generations model with finite lives, wherein 
the economy’s educational state is characterized by a distribution of schooling lev-
els. The key assumption there is analogous to Assumption 1 and relates to how cap-
ital affects the productivity of education relative to that of raw labor.
In the concluding section, we discuss how our findings relate to the large and 
still-growing literature on the long-run implications of investment-specific techno-
logical change.
I. The Extended Uzawa Growth Theorem and a Possible Way Out
In this section, we state and prove a version of the Uzawa Growth Theorem, 
using methods adapted from Schlicht (2006) and Jones and Scrimgeour (2008). 
We extend the theorem to allow for falling investment-good prices and the possible 
accumulation of human capital. We also show how investments in schooling can 
loosen the straitjacket of the theorem, but only if capital accumulation boosts the 
marginal product of education proportionally more than it does the marginal product 
of raw labor.
Let  Y t = F ( A t  K t ,  B t  L t ,  s t ) be a standard neoclassical production function with 
constant returns to scale in its first two arguments, where, as usual,  Y t is output,  K t is 
capital,  L t is labor, and where  A t and  B t characterize the state of (disembodied) tech-
nology at time  t , augmenting respectively physical capital and raw labor.9 We take  s t 
to be some scalar measure of the prevailing education level in the economy that is 
independent of the economy’s size. For example,  s t might be the average years of 
schooling among workers, or the fraction of the labor force with a college degree, or 
the ratio of trained managers to production-line workers. The labor force  L t grows at 
some constant rate,  g L , that can be positive, negative, or zero.
8 More precisely, we show in the online Appendix that balanced growth in the presence of ongoing 
 capital-augmenting technological progress requires that the technology has a representation with the form indicated 
in Assumption 1. 
9 For ease of exposition and for comparability with the literature, we treat technology as a combination of com-
ponents that augment physical capital and raw labor. However, as we show in the online Appendix, our Proposition 1 
can readily be extended to any constant returns to scale production function with the form  F ( K t ,  L t ,  s t ; t) . Indeed, 
Uzawa (1961) originally proved his theorem (without the education variable  s t ) in this more general form. 
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At time  t , the economy can convert one unit of output into  q t units of capital. 
Growth in  q t represents what Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) have 
called investment-specific technological change. This is a form of embodied techni-
cal change—familiar from the earlier work of Johansen (1959), Solow (1960), and 
others—inasmuch as new capital goods require less foregone consumption than did 
prior vintages of capital. The economy’s resource constraint can be written as
  Y t =  C t +  I t / q t , 
where  C t is consumption and  I t is the number of newly installed units of capital. 
Investment in new capital augments the capital stock after replacing depreciation, 
which occurs at a fixed rate  δ : i.e.,
  K ̇t =  I t − δ K t . 
We begin with a lemma that extends slightly the one proved by Jones and 
Scrimgeour (2008) so as to allow for investment-specific technological progress. 
Define a balanced growth path (BGP) as a trajectory along which the economy 
experiences constant proportional rates of growth of  Y t ,  C t , and  K t . Let  g X =  X ̇/X 
denote the growth rate of the variable  X along a BGP. 
LEMMA 1: Suppose  g q is constant. Then, along any BGP with 
0 <  C t <  Y t ,  g Y =  g C =  g K −  g q .
The proof, which closely follows Jones and Scrimgeour, is relegated to the online 
Appendix. The lemma states that the growth rates of consumption and capital mirror 
that of total output. However, with the possibility of investment-specific technolog-
ical progress, it is the value of the capital stock measured in units of the final good 
(and the resources used in investment) that grows at the same rate as output.10
Now define  γ K ≡  g A +  g q . This can be viewed as the total rate of capi-
tal-augmenting technological change, combining the rate of disembodied prog-
ress ( g A ) and the rate of embodied progress ( g q ). Also, define, as we did before, 
 σ KL ≡  ( F L F K ) / ( F LK F) to be the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
holding fixed the education index. In the online Appendix, we prove the following 
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose  q grows at constant rate  g q . If there exists a BGP along 
which factor shares are constant and strictly positive when the factors are paid their 
marginal products, then
(1)  (1 −  σ KL )  γ K =  σ KL   F L  ___ F K  
∂ ( F s / F L )  ________∂K s ̇. 
The proposition stipulates a relationship between the combined rate of 
 capital-augmenting technological progress and the change in the education index 
10 When capital goods are valued, their price  p t in terms of final goods must equal the cost of new investment, 
i.e.,  p t = 1/ q t . 
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that is needed to keep factor shares constant as the value of the capital stock and 
output grow at common rates.
We can now revisit the two cases that are familiar from the literature. First, sup-
pose that there are no opportunities for investment in schooling, so that  s remains 
constant. This is the setting considered by Uzawa (1961). Setting  s ̇ = 0 in (1) 
yields Corollary 1.
COROLLARY 1 (Uzawa): Suppose that  s is constant. Then a BGP with constant 
and strictly positive factor shares can exist only if  σ KL = 1 or  γ K = 0 .
As is well known, balanced growth in a neoclassical economy with exogenous pop-
ulation growth and no investments in human capital requires either a  Cobb-Douglas 
production function or an absence of capital-augmenting technological progress.11
Second, suppose that (effective) labor and schooling can be aggregated 
into an index of human capital,  H (BL, s) , such that net output can be writ-
ten as a function of effective physical capital and human capital, as in Uzawa 
(1965); Lucas (1988); or Acemoglu (2009). Denote this production function by 
 F ̃[AK, H(BL, s)] ≡ F(AK, BL, s). Then  F s / F L =  H s / H L , which is independent of 
K . Setting  ∂ ( F s / F L ) /∂K = 0 in (1) yields Corollary 2.
COROLLARY 2 (Human Capital): Suppose that there exists a measure of human 
capital,  H (BL, s) , such that  F (AK, BL, s) ≡  F ̃[AK, H (BL, s) ] . Then a BGP with 
constant and strictly positive factor shares can exist only if  σ KL = 1 or  γ K = 0 .
In this case, ongoing accumulation of human capital cannot perpetually neutral-
ize the effects of capital deepening on the factor shares.
However, Proposition 1 suggests that balanced growth with constant factor shares 
might be possible despite a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor and the presence of capital-augmenting technological progress, so long as 
s ̇ ≠ 0 and  ∂ ( F s / F L ) /∂K ≠ 0 . Suppose, for example, that  σ KL < 1 , as seems most 
consistent with the evidence. Suppose further that educational attainment grows 
over time, again in line with observation. Then the existence of a BGP with constant 
factor shares requires  ∂ ( F s / F L ) /∂K > 0 ; i.e., an increase in the capital stock must 
raise the marginal product of schooling by proportionally more than it does the mar-
ginal product of raw labor. In looser parlance, the technology must be characterized 
by capital-skill complementarity.12
11 Our Proposition 1 is predicated on constant and interior factor shares. But, in the Uzawa case, log differenti-
ation of the production function with respect to time, holding  s constant, implies
 g Y =  θ K ( g A +  g K ) +  (1 −  θ K )  ( g B +  g L ) , 
where  θ K = K F K /Y is the capital share in national income. In a steady state in which  Y and  K grow at constant 
rates in response to constant rates of growth of  A, B, L , and  q ,  θ K must be constant as well. Note that Jones and 
Scrimgeour do not assume constant factor shares in their statement and proof of the Uzawa Growth Theorem. 
12 Some might ask why we interpret  s as schooling, rather than some other variable that evolves over time and 
affects factor productivity. First, we need  s to be endogenous, otherwise it could be subsumed into the technology. 
Second, we want  s to be something that econometricians have used as a control variable when estimating the elas-
ticity of substitution,  σ KL , inasmuch as we rely on those estimates when assuming  σ KL < 1 . Most recent estimates 
of the elasticity of substitution use quality-adjusted measures of labor and wages that control for schooling (e.g., 
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The results in this section use only resource constraints and the assumption 
that factors are paid their marginal products. We have, as yet, provided no model 
of  savings or of schooling decisions. Moreover, we have shown that a BGP with 
 constant factor shares might exist, but not that one does exist under some reasonable 
set of assumptions about individual behavior and a reasonable specification of the 
aggregate production function. In the next section, we study a simple economy in 
which the level of education can be summarized by a scalar variable that can jump 
discretely from one moment to the next. In Grossman et al. (2016), we consider a 
more realistic setting in which individuals’ education accumulates slowly over time 
and the distribution of schooling levels in the economy evolves gradually.
II. Balanced Growth with Short Lifespans
We begin by posing a social planner’s problem that incorporates a reduced-form 
treatment of schooling choice. In Section IIA, the planner designs a time path for a 
scalar variable that summarizes the education level in the workforce. The planner faces 
a trade-off between the level of schooling and the labor available for producing output. 
The economy experiences both labor-augmenting and capital-augmenting technolog-
ical progress, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in aggregate 
production is less than 1. Here we show that the planner’s allocation converges to a 
unique BGP for a specified class of production functions and under certain parame-
ter restrictions. Moreover, if the efficient allocation can be characterized by balanced 
growth after some moment in time, then the technology must have a representation 
with a production function in the specified class. We derive the steady-state growth 
rate of output for the planner’s solution and the associated (and constant) factor shares.
In the succeeding subsections, we develop a pair of models of individual behavior 
and aggregate production that generate education functions that exhibit the form 
posited in Section IIA. At the end of the section, we discuss briefly the results in 
Grossman et al. (2016) that can be derived from a more realistic model of schooling 
choice with overlapping generations.13
A. A Planner’s Problem with a Reduced-Form Education Function
The economy comprises a continuum of identical family dynasties of measure 1. 
Each family has a continuum  N t of members alive at time  t , where  N t grows at the 
exogenous rate  n . Dynastic utility at some time  t 0 is given by
(2)  u ( t 0 ) =  ∫  t 0  ∞  N t  e −ρ (t− t 0 )    c t 1−η − 1 ______1 − η  dt, 
where  c t is consumption per family member at time  t and  ρ is the subjective discount 
rate.
Antràs 2004; Klump, McAdam, and Willman 2007; Oberfield and Raval 2014) or focus on cross-sectional variation 
across industries so that schooling choices do not vary (Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer 2011). 
13 In our working paper, we also describe how the model can be extended to include directed technical change, 
in the manner suggested by Acemoglu (2003). We show that the equilibrium of such a model generally exhibits both 
capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technical change. 
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Consider the problem facing a social planner who seeks to maximize utility 
for the representative dynasty subject to a resource constraint, an evolving tech-
nology, and an ongoing trade-off between some measure of the economy’s educa-
tion level and the contemporaneous labor supply. Write this trade-off in reduced 
form as  L t = D ( s t )  N t , with  D′ ( s t ) < 0 for all  s t , where  L t measures the raw labor 
that produces output at time  t and  s t is a scalar index that summarizes the distribu-
tion of schooling levels among those workers. The production function takes the 
form  Y t = F ( A t  K t ,  B t  L t ,  s t ) , where  A t again converts physical capital to effective 
capital in view of the disembodied technology available at time  t , and similarly  B t 
converts raw labor to effective labor. We assume that  F ( · ) has constant returns to 
scale in its first two arguments, i.e., that doubling the physical inputs doubles output 
for any education level and any state of technology. The economy can convert one 
unit of the final good into  q t units of capital at time  t . Capital depreciates at the con-
stant rate  δ and labor-augmenting technological progress takes place at the constant 
rate  γ L ≡  B ̇t / B t . 
We assume that the technology can be represented by a member of a class of 
aggregate production functions that take the following form.
ASSUMPTION 1: The production function can be written as  F (AK, BL, s) 
=  F ̃[D  (s) a AK, D  (s) −b BL] , with  a, b > 0 , where
 (i )  h (z) ≡  F ̃(z, 1) is strictly increasing, twice differentiable, and strictly con-
cave for all  z ; and
 (ii )  σ KL ≡  F L  F K /F F LK < 1 .
Assumption 1 immediately implies that  ∂ ( F s / F L ) /∂K > 0 .14 Therefore, the tech-
nology satisfies the prerequisites for the existence of a BGP, per Proposition 1, pro-
vided that the planner’s optimal choice of schooling is rising over time.
We also impose some parameter restrictions. Let   h (z) ≡ zh′ (z) /h (z) be 
the elasticity of the  h ( · ) function. Note that   h (z) is strictly decreasing under 
Assumption 1.15 
ASSUMPTION 2: (i)  lim z→0    h (z) <  b ___ a + b; (ii)  lim z→∞    h (z) <  b − 1 ___ a + b − 1
<  lim z→0    h (z) ;  (iii)  ρ > n +  (1 − η)  [ γ L +  b − 1 ___a  γ K ] .
Part (i) of Assumption 2 ensures that the marginal product of schooling is 
 nonnegative for all levels of  K, L, and  s .16 Part (ii) guarantees that the optimal 
14 See the proof in the online Appendix. We also prove that, under Assumption 1,  σ KL < 1 if and only if 
 F (AK, BL, s) is strictly log supermodular in  K and  s , which is another way of expressing capital-skill complementarity. 
15 To see this, note that  d ln   h (z) /d ln z =  [1 −   h (z) ]  ( σ KL − 1) / σ KL , which is negative when  σ KL < 1 . 
16 Assumption 1 implies  F s (AK, BL, s) =  [D′ (s) /D (s) ] [aK F K (AK, BL, s) − bL F L (AK, BL, s) ] . The assump-
tion that  F (AK, BL, s) is constant returns to scale implies  F (AK, BL, s) = K F K (AK, BL, s) + L F L (AK, BL, s) . 
Combining these two equations, we see that  F s > 0 for all  AK,  BL , and  s if and only if  lim z→0    h (z) < b/ (a + b) . 
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 schooling choice is positive, as we will see below. It also implies, with Assumption 1 
and Assumption 2(i), that  b > 1 .17 Part (iii) ensures that utility in (2) is finite.
The planner’s problem has two separable components, one static and one 
dynamic. The static problem is to choose the education level and the labor force at 
every moment in time so as to maximize output  Y t , subject to the inverse relation-
ship between the two. The dynamic problem is to allocate consumption over time 
so as to maximize dynastic utility in (2), subject to the aggregate capital accumu-
lation equation,  K ̇t =  q t ( Y t −  N t  c t ) − δ K t . The solution to the dynamic problem 
is standard and features the familiar Euler equation. We provide the details in the 
online Appendix. Here we focus on the static problem, which captures how the 
planner’s choice of education,  s t , relates to the state of technology, as summarized 
by  { A t  ,  B t ,  q t } , and the momentary capital stock,  K t .
In the light of Assumption 1, the planner’s static problem boils down to choos-
ing  s t and  L t at every moment in time to maximize  Y t =  F ̃[D  ( s t ) a  A t  K t , D  ( s t ) −b  B t  L t ] , 
subject to the resource constraint,  L t = D ( s t )  N t . Once we substitute the constraint 
into the maximand, we have
  Y t =  max  s t  
   F ̃[D  ( s t ) a  A t  K t , D  ( s t ) 1−b  B t  N t ] 
 =  max  s t  
  D  ( s t ) 1−b  B t  N t F ̃[ D  ( s t ) a+b−1  A t  K t   ____________ B t  N t  , 1] . 
Now, make a change of variables, using  z t ≡ D  ( s t ) a+b−1  A t  K t / B t  N t , and recall the 
definition of  h (z) ≡  F ̃(z, 1) . Then the static problem can be rewritten as
(3)  Y t =  max  z t     ( B t  N t ) 1−θ  ( A t  K t ) θ  z t −θ h ( z t ) , 
where  θ ≡  (b − 1) / (a + b − 1) . The first-order condition for this problem implies
(4)   h ( z t ) = θ  for all t ≥  t 0 . 
In other words, the planner chooses education so that  z t ≡ D  ( s t ) a+b−1  A t  K t / B t  N t 
remains constant over time;  z t =  z ∗ =   h −1 (θ) . In this sense, the planner offsets 
capital deepening with increased schooling. Part (ii) of Assumption 2 ensures 
that there exists a strictly positive solution for  z ∗ and the fact that   h (z) is strictly 
decreasing implies that the solution is unique.18 Once  z t is chosen optimally 
with  z t =  z ∗ , (3) implies that output is a Cobb-Douglas function of effective capital 
and  technology-augmented population, with exponents  θ and  1 − θ , respectively.
We will not rehearse the details of the transition path; these are familiar from neo-
classical growth theory. In the online Appendix, we show that the planner chooses 
the initial per capita consumption level,  c  t 0  , so as to put the economy on the unique 
17 Assumption 1(i) implies  lim z→∞    h (z) ≥ 0 . So, Assumption 2(ii) requires  (b − 1) / (a + b − 1) > 0 . 
Thus, if  a + b > 1 , then  b > 1 . Suppose  a + b < 1 and  b < 1 . Then Assumption 2(i) and Assumption 2(ii) 
imply  b (a + b − 1) <  (a + b) (b − 1) or  b <  (b − 1) , which cannot hold. Thus, we must have  b > 1 . 
18 In the online Appendix, we show that the second-order condition is satisfied at  z t =  z ∗ under Assumption 1. 
Moreover, we show that the second-order condition would be violated if the elasticity of substitution between cap-
ital and labor were to exceed 1. 
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saddle path that converges to a steady state. On the BGP, consumption and output 
grow at constant rate  g Y and the capital stock grows at constant rate  g K .
We can readily calculate the growth rates of output and consumption along the 
BGP. From  z t ≡ D  ( s t ) a+b−1  A t  K t / B t  N t and the fact that  z t =  z ∗ along an optimal 
trajectory, we have
  (a + b − 1)  g D +  g A +  g K =  γ L + n 
for all  t ≥  t 0 . By setting  z t =  z ∗ in (3) and then log differentiating with respect to 
time, we also find that
  (a + b − 1)  g Y = a ( γ L + n) +  (b − 1)  ( g A +  g K ) 
along the optimal path. Finally, combining these two equations and using Lemma 1—
which requires that  g Y =  g K −  g q along any BGP—we can solve for  g D and  g Y . 
Proposition 2 reports the results.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose there is a trade-off between labor supply and a sum-
mary index of economy-wide education given by  L t = D ( s t )  N t . Let Assumptions 1 
and 2 hold. Then along the optimal trajectory from any initial capital stock,  K  t 0  , the 
economy converges to a BGP. On the BGP,
 (i) aggregate output and aggregate consumption grow at the common 
rate  g Y = n +  γ L +  b − 1 ___a  γ K ; 
 (ii) the index of education grows according to  s ̇ = −  γ K D (s)  _____
aD′ (s)  , so that  g D = − 
 γ K  __a .
The growth of per capita income is increasing in the rate of labor-augmenting 
technological progress, just as in the neoclassical growth model without endog-
enous schooling. But now a BGP exists even when there is ongoing capital-aug-
menting technological progress or when the price of investment goods is falling 
at a constant rate. The fact that  b > 1 implies that the growth rate of per capita 
income also is increasing in  γ K , the combined rate of embodied and disembodied 
capital-augmenting progress.
We have not as yet introduced any market decentralization, which we will do only 
for the specific models described in Sections IIB and IIC below. However, in antici-
pation that capital will be paid its marginal product in a competitive equilibrium, we 
can define the capital share in national income at time  t as  θ Kt =  (∂ Y t /∂ K t )  K t / Y t . 
Using (3) with  z t =  z ∗ , we see that  θ Kt =  (b − 1) / (a + b − 1) ≡ θ for all 
 t ≥  t 0 . The labor share, which includes the return to education, equals  1 − θ . 
That is, the planner chooses the trajectories for the capital stock and schooling such 
that the factor shares remain constant, both along the transition path and in the steady 
state. Notice that the growth rate and the capital share both are increasing in  b and 
decreasing in  a ; in this sense, fast growth and a high capital share go hand in hand.
We offer some remarks about the role of Assumption 1 and the intuition for our 
BGP. With  Y t =  F ̃[ A t  K t D  ( s t ) a ,  B t  L t D  ( s t ) −b ] , the effect of schooling on the rela-
tionship between inputs and output is akin to that of factor-biased technical  progress. 
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Hicks (1932) described the bias in technical progress according to its impact on 
relative factor demands at given relative factor prices. Technical progress is labor 
saving (or, equivalently, capital using) if it causes an increased relative demand for 
capital at the initial wage-to-rental ratio. In our setting, and under Assumption 1, 
added schooling does exactly that; it tilts the unit isoquants in  (K, L) space in such 
a way that the cost-minimizing technique shifts toward capital.19 We can say, there-
fore, that the productivity gains associated with schooling are capital using.
Capital-augmenting technological progress expands the relative supply of effec-
tive capital. In our model, it also induces investment in education. This increases the 
relative demand for capital. With our functional form assumption, the extra demand 
just absorbs the excess supply. To see that this is so, notice that  D  ( s t ) a  A t  q t is con-
stant along the BGP. In short, the optimal schooling choice generates extra demand 
for equipment that neutralizes the effect of the capital-augmenting progress and the 
declining investment-good prices on the growth of the effective capital stock.20
Effectively, there is a horse race between the effects of capital deepening and of 
education on the factor shares which, with the multiplicative way that  D (s) interacts 
with the two inputs and the constant elasticities on this variable, ends in a dead heat. 
As capital accumulates and becomes more productive due to technical progress, the 
less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor exerts down-
ward pressure on the capital share. Meanwhile, complementarity between effective 
capital and schooling means that capital accumulation raises the return to educa-
tion. The planner responds by investing more in schooling, which depresses the 
education-plus-technology augmented capital stock relative to the education-plus- 
technology augmented labor force. This exerts upward pressure on the capital share. 
With the functional form specified in Assumption 1, the two forces just balance.
Needless to say, Assumption 1 describes a broad class of technologies. For con-
creteness, we offer one example. Consider21
(5)  Y t =  ( B t  L t )  a ___ a+b  { ( A t  K t ) α +  [D  ( s t ) − (a+b)   B t  L t ] α }  
b/ (a+b)  ______α  . 
19 Following Takayama (1974), define  ϖ (k, s, t) as the ratio of the marginal product of labor to the marginal 
product of capital, where  k ≡ AK/BL . Under Assumption 1,
 ϖ ( k, s, t) =  Bk ___A [ 1 ____________   h (D  (s) a+b k)  − 1] . 
Since  D (s) is strictly decreasing in  s and   h (z) is strictly decreasing in  z , it follows that  ϖ s < 0 . This means that 
schooling is Hicks labor-saving in Takayama’s terminology. 
20 Violante (2008) defines skill-biased technical change as a technology change that, ceteris paribus, raises the 
marginal product of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor in the formation of an aggregate labor input. By 
analogy, we might also say that education under our Assumption 1 is capital biased; growth in  s raises  F K / F L at a 
given input ratio. 
21 Our example makes use of the fact (shown in the online Appendix), that, whenever the marginal product of 
schooling is positive, Assumption 1 is formally equivalent to assuming that  F (AK, BL, s) can be written as
 F (AK, BL, s) =  (BL)  a ___ a+b G  (AK, D  (s) − (a+b)  BL)  b ____ a+b 
where  G( · ) is constant returns to scale, strictly increasing in both its arguments,  G (z, 1) is twice differentiable and 
strictly concave for all  z , and  σ KL G ≡   G K  G L  ____G  G KL < 1 . Written in this form, the basis for the complementarity between 
capital and schooling is clear. The example in (5) is the special case of this formulation in which  G ( · ) has a constant 
elasticity of substitution between its two arguments. 
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Then output at time  t can be expressed as a function of  D  ( s t ) a  A t  K t and D ( s t ) −b  B t L t . 
With  a > 0, b > 1, and  α < 0 , Assumptions 1 and 2 are both satisfied. Here, the 
negative value of  α generates the required complementarity between capital and 
schooling.22
One might wonder whether we are able to dispense with the functional-form restric-
tion of Assumption 1. The answer to this question is no. In the online Appendix, we 
prove that if  L t = D ( s t )  N t and if the solution to the social planner’s problem exhibits 
balanced growth after some time  T with increasing schooling and a constant capital 
share  θ K ∈  (0, 1) , then either there is no capital-augmenting technological progress ( γ K = 0 ) or else the technology can be represented along the equilibrium trajectory 
by a production function with the form  F ̃[ A t KD ( s) a ,  B t LD ( s) −b ] , with  a > 0 and 
b = 1 + a  θ K / (1 −  θ K ) > 1 . In other words, Assumption 1 is not only sufficient 
for the existence of a BGP with  γ K > 0 and  σ KL < 1 , but it is essentially necessary 
as well. As with any model that generates balanced growth, knife-edge restrictions 
are required to maintain the balance; our model is no exception to this rule.
To demonstrate the flexibility of our approach, we next present two examples of 
market economies that generate the reduced form described above. The discussion 
of the two models in the main text is brief; details are in the online Appendix.
B. Balanced Growth in a “Time-in-School” Model
As above, the representative family has a continuum  N t of members at time  t . 
Each life is fleetingly brief; an individual attends school for the first fraction of her 
momentary existence and then joins the workforce for the remainder of her life. 
The variable  s t now represents the fraction of life that the representative member of 
the generation alive at time  t devotes to education; she spends the remaining frac-
tion  1 −  s t working. In this case,  D (s) = 1 − s , so that the family’s labor supply 
is  L t =  N t (1 −  s t ) . Given the brevity of life, there is no discounting of an individu-
al’s wages relative to her time in school. But dynasties do discount the earnings (and 
well being) of subsequent generations relative to those currently alive. Every new 
cohort starts from scratch with no schooling.
Each individual chooses her consumption, savings, and schooling to maximize 
total dynastic utility, which at time  t 0 is given by (2). Each individual supposes that 
other family members in her own and subsequent generations will behave similarly. 
Savings are used to purchase units of physical capital, which are passed on within 
the family from one generation to the next. The  N t members of the representative 
dynasty collectively inherit  K t units of capital at time  t , considering that the aggre-
gate capital stock is fully owned by the population and there is a unit continuum of 
dynasties in the economy.
Firms produce output using capital, labor, and the technology available to them 
at the time. Each firm rents capital on a competitive market and allocates it to its 
employees, taking into consideration their levels of education. A firm’s output is the 
22 It is possible to interpret (5) in terms of a two-task production process. Suppose each worker contributes 
a joint input of educated and raw labor (brains and brawn). The firm combines the educated labor (defined as 
D  ( s t ) − (a+b)   L t ) with effective capital to complete one task. In so doing, the two have a constant elasticity of substi-
tution of  1/ (1 − α) < 1 . Meanwhile, the input of raw labor addresses the second task. Finally, the two tasks enter 
the overall production function in Cobb-Douglas form. 
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sum of what is produced by its various workers. As usual, the  profit-maximizing 
choices for the firm equate the marginal product of each unit of capital to the compet-
itive rental rate and the marginal product of each type of worker to her competitive 
wage. The equilibrium determines a wage schedule,  W t (s) , which gives the wage of a 
worker with schooling  s at time  t . Even for those schooling options that are not actu-
ally chosen in equilibrium at time  t , we can calculate a worker’s marginal product and 
thus what the wage would be, based on the prevailing technology and the capital that 
a firm would allocate to such a worker at the prevailing rental rate.
Schooling choices have no persistence for the family. Therefore, an individual 
alive at time  t who seeks to maximize dynastic utility should choose  s to maxi-
mize her own wage income,  (1 − s)  W t (s) . The first-order condition for this prob-
lem requires  (1 −  s t )  W t ′( s t ) =  W t ( s t ) . We show in the online Appendix that this 
first–order condition for privately optimal schooling choice implies that in the com-
petitive equilibrium
   h ( (1 −  s t ) a+b−1   A t  K t  ____ B t  N t ) =  b − 1 ______ a + b − 1. 
Evidently, the individual’s income-maximizing choice of schooling matches the 
planner’s path for  s t in (4), once we recognize that  D (s) = 1 − s . Part (ii) of 
Proposition 2 then implies
  s ̇t =  (1 −  s t )   γ K  ___a . 
On a BGP, schooling rises over time, but at a declining rate; the complemen-
tary time spent working,  D (s) = 1 − s , falls at a constant exponential rate, 
 D ̇(s) /D (s) = − γ K /a .
It comes as no surprise that the market equilibrium with perfect competition and 
complete markets mimics the planner’s solution. The point we wish to emphasize is 
that the time-in-school model converges to a BGP and that the wage schedule  W t (s) 
gives the family members the appropriate incentives to extend their time in school 
from one generation to the next. The returns to schooling rise with the accumulation 
of effective capital, thanks to the assumed capital-schooling complementarity, and 
the extra schooling is exactly what is needed to maintain balanced growth of the two 
inputs to production.
C. Balanced Growth in a “Manager-Worker” Model
Now, we present an entirely different model that yields a similar reduced form. 
We imagine teams that combine managers and production workers. Firms allocate 
capital equipment to teams according to their productivity. Only production workers 
are directly responsible for operating equipment and thus for generating output. But 
the productivity of a team depends on the ratio of its managers to workers, as in the 
hierarchical models of management proposed by Beckmann (1977), Rosen (1982), 
and others.
The family structure, demographics, and preferences are the same as before. 
Lifespans are short. Each individual decides whether to devote a fixed fraction  m of 
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her potential working life to school. If she opts to do so, she will acquire the skills 
needed to serve as a manager and she will have  1 − m units of time remaining to 
perform this function. Those who do not go for management training are employed as 
production workers. They will use all of their available time to earn unskilled wages.
Let  L t be the time units supplied by production workers at time  t and let  M t be the 
time units supplied by managers. Since production workers devote all of their time 
to their jobs,  L t is also the number of production workers. Managers are in school a 
fraction  m of their time, so the number of managers is  M t / (1 − m) . The population 
divides between workers and managers, so
(6)  L t +   M t  ____ 1 − m =  N t . 
This time, we take  s t =  M t / L t to be our index of schooling. This is the ratio 
of manager hours to worker hours (or of skilled to unskilled labor) and the 
inverse of the typical manager’s span of control. With this definition, (6) implies 
 L t +  L t  s t / (1 − m) =  N t , so that  D (s) =  [1 + s/ (1 − m) ] −1 in this model.
Monitoring makes the workers and their equipment more productive. In par-
ticular, we suppose that the production function at time  t can be written as 
 F ̃[D  (s) a  A t K, D  (s) −b  B t L] , with  F ̃( · ) homogeneous of degree 1 in its two argu-
ments. With  s = M/L , this implies that output is a constant returns to scale func-
tion of the three inputs,  A t K,  B t L , and  B t M .
In this model, the education decision for the representative individual born at 
time  t is simple: pursue schooling if lifetime earnings of a manager exceed those 
of a worker and not otherwise. In an equilibrium with  M t > 0 , every individual 
must be indifferent between the two occupations, so that  (1 − m)  W Mt =  W Lt , 
where  W Mt and  W Lt are the wages per unit time of managers and workers, respec-
tively. Over time, accumulation of effective capital exerts upward pressure on the 
skill premium, because the functional form of Assumption 1 ensures that capital is 
more complementary with managers than it is with production workers. This pro-
vides the incentive for a greater fraction of each new generation to gain skills. The 
expanding relative supply of managers to workers restores the equality in earnings.
In the online Appendix, we show that equalization of lifetime earnings of workers 
and managers implies
   h ( [1 +   s t  ____ 1 − m] 
− (a+b)    A t  K t  ____ B t  L t ) =  b − 1 ______ a + b − 1. 
This gives the same education index as in the planner’s solution (4). It follows that 
the economy converges to a BGP, with a constant rate of output growth given by 
part (i) of Proposition 2, and with a constant capital share and an ever increasing 
ratio of manager hours to worker hours.
D. Balanced Growth with Overlapping Generations
The models described in Sections IIB and IIC are rather stylized, because they 
assume that an economy’s education can be described by a scalar variable that can 
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jump from one moment to the next. In reality, schooling investments take time and 
an economy’s distribution of education levels adjusts slowly. In our working paper, 
Grossman et al. (2016), we develop an overlapping-generations (OLG) model that 
has these features. Here, we describe briefly the additional insights and predictions 
that emerge from that analysis.
In the OLG model, individuals experience finite but stochastic lifespans. Births 
and deaths occur with constant hazard rates. An individual devotes the first part of 
her existence to school. She chooses the target length of time to remain in school 
before entering the labor force. If the individual survives to adulthood, she spends 
the second phase of life working, with a productivity that depends on her educa-
tional attainment, her experience, and on technology at the time. Firms allocate 
capital to their workers as a function of these characteristics, and a firm’s total out-
put is the sum of what is produced by its various workers. Productivity rises with 
experience early in a worker’s career, but falls with experience subsequently. If a 
worker survives until her productivity falls to zero, she retires.
Analogous to Assumption 1, we assume in the OLG model that if  L workers with 
s years of schooling and  u years of experience are allocated  K units of capital, they 
can produce  F ̃( e −as  A t K,  e bs  B t L, u) units of output at time  t . In the equilibrium, 
every birth cohort chooses a different educational target. The labor force comprises 
workers with different schooling levels and different years of experience who work 
with different amounts of capital. Despite this richness, the economy-wide distri-
butions of schooling and experience evolve in a relatively simple way that permits 
aggregation.
Like the short-lifespan models of Sections IIB and IIC, the OLG economy has 
a unique BGP. Along the BGP, educational attainment increases linearly over time, 
much like the patterns depicted in Figure 2 for long stretches of US history. The 
wage structure at every moment takes a Mincerian form (see Mincer 1974), with 
log wages that vary in the cross section with schooling and experience. Finally, the 
model predicts declining labor-force participation, consistent with the postwar evi-
dence for men in the United States.
One important difference between the OLG model and the short-lifespan models 
is worth emphasizing. In the OLG model of Grossman et al. (2016), factor shares 
are neither constant along the transition path nor independent of the rates of techno-
logical progress in the long run. Our numerical analysis suggests that a permanent 
slowdown in the rate of capital-augmenting technological progress will induce an 
increase in the capital share. In fact, with plausible parameter values, a one per-
centage point decline in the annual rate of investment-specific technical change—
such as has been measured by the International Monetary Fund (2014, p.89) for the 
period after 2000—might account for much or all of the rise in the capital share in 
US national income that has been witnessed in those years.
III. Relationship to the Literature on Investment-Specific Technical Change
By way of concluding remarks, it might be useful for us to relate our results to 
the large literature that has studied the long-run implications of investment-specific 
technological change. In his seminal paper on embodied technical progress, Solow 
(1960) did not close his model to solve for a steady state, but he indicated how 
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this could be done. However, Solow employed a Cobb-Douglas production  function 
throughout this paper, and his discussion about closing the model relies on this 
assumption. Sheshinski (1967) demonstrated convergence to a BGP in an extended 
version of the Johansen (1959) model with both embodied and disembodied techno-
logical progress. Although he does not restrict attention to any particular production 
function, he does insist that both forms of progress are Harrod-neutral, i.e., they aug-
ment the productivity of labor. So, the technology gains in Sheshinski’s paper, while 
embodied in vintages of capital, are nonetheless assumed to be  labor-augmenting. 
These findings are echoed in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), who resur-
rected the literature on technological improvements that are embodied in new equip-
ment. They studied an economy that has no opportunities for schooling in which 
two types of capital (equipment and structures) and labor are combined to produce 
consumption goods. Unlike Sheshinski, they do not assume that embodied progress 
is Harrod-neutral and, consequently, they are led to conclude that a  Cobb-Douglas 
production function is necessary to generate balanced growth, in keeping with the 
dictates of the Uzawa Growth Theorem.
Krusell et al. (2000) posit a technology with capital-skill complementarity 
according to which output is produced with equipment, structures, and two types 
of labor (skilled and unskilled). Leaving aside their distinction between equip-
ment and structures, their model is one with capital and two types of labor, much 
like our manager-worker model in Section IIC above. Although their production 
function incorporates capital-skill complementarity, it does not satisfy the dic-
tates of our Assumption 1. Nor do they endogenously determine the supplies of 
skilled and unskilled workers. They, and much of the substantial literature that 
has adopted their production function, do not address the prospects for balanced 
growth with ongoing declines in investment-good prices and endogenous school-
ing, but instead focus on the transition dynamics that result from a specified 
sequence of relative price changes and of factor supplies. Two recent papers do 
try to generate balanced growth in models of investment-specific technological 
progress that is not Harrod-neutral. He and Liu (2008) introduce endogenous 
schooling into the Krusell et al. (2000) model, so that the relative supplies of 
skilled and unskilled labor are determined in the general equilibrium. They define 
a BGP to be an equilibrium trajectory along which equipment, structures, and 
output all grow at constant rates and the fraction of skilled workers converges 
to a constant. With this definition, they conclude (see their Proposition  1) that 
balanced growth is consistent with ongoing investment-specific technological 
change only when the aggregate production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form. 
Maliar and Maliar (2011) study a similar environment, but assume instead that 
the stocks of skilled and unskilled labor grow at constant and exogenous rates. 
They show that balanced growth requires  g A < 0 to offset the  investment-specific 
technology gains, such that (in our notation)  γ K = 0 . In contrast to these papers, 
we have shown that balanced growth is in fact compatible with a falling rela-
tive price of capital, nonnegative growth in capital productivity, and  σ KL ≠ 1 , 
provided that capital and schooling are sufficiently complementary. Our result 
requires that the aggregate production function falls into the class defined by 
Assumption 1 and that an appropriate index of the economy’s educational out-
come is rising over time.
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The basic mechanism in our model is straightforward: over time, growing stocks 
of effective capital raise the returns to schooling, which induces individuals to spend 
more time in school. Inasmuch as capital and labor are complements, capital accu-
mulation tends to lower capital’s share in national income, but this is offset by the 
subsequent rise in schooling, because capital and schooling are also complements. 
When capital and schooling are more complementary than capital and labor, the sec-
ond effect can neutralize the first. Although the presence of these offsetting forces 
is natural enough, restrictions on how schooling enters the production function are 
needed to maintain exact balance along an equilibrium trajectory. The restrictions 
are in a sense analogous to those usually imposed on preferences in a dynamic 
model in order to generate balanced growth. Specifically, while it may be natural 
to assume that income and substitution effects offset one another as wages rise, the 
intratemporal utility function must be specified in a particular way so as to main-
tain perfect balance along an equilibrium trajectory. Just as balanced-growth pref-
erences are consistent with a range of intertemporal elasticities of substitution and 
labor-supply elasticities, so too are the restrictions we impose on the production 
function consistent with a range of elasticities of substitution between capital and 
labor and between capital and schooling.
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